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1. A related issue is the
complementarity of public
and private investment. As
Zachmann (2012) argues,
long-term growth prospects
are fundamentally deter-
mined by structural factors
that are often complemen-
tary and inter-related, such
as infrastructure, human
capital, financial sector
development and the qual-
ity of regulation. When
addressing structural weak-
nesses, targeting individual
shortcomings might not be
beneficial if other barriers
persist and therefore public
investment might be best
employed when it is tar-
geted at individual short-
comings that are holding
back an entire sector.
2. By focusing on EU cohe-
sion policy, the literature
survey in Marzinotto
(2012) found similar
results.
THE PURPOSE OF PUBLIC INVESTMENT
Public investment should help societies achieve
their goals, and should ultimately contribute to
social welfare. High quality capital stocks in the
areas of communication, education or transport
are typically thought to entail considerable
spillover effects that might stimulate investment
by the private sector. Public order and safety are
necessary for a stable institutional environment.
Investments in social protection, healthcare and
recreation support the labour force and social
development. Housing and community amenities,
such as water supply and street lightening, are
preconditions of normal life. Environmental pro-
tection can support sustainable development.
However, public investment might not always be
free from the influence of interest groups. Even if
the intent is to increase social welfare, public
investment might not go to the right place, or
might not be deployed in the most efficient way.
When assessing the impact of public investment
on the economy, two issues have to be differenti-
ated1: 
a) The impact of public investment on
medium/long-term growth and output,
b) The impact of cuts in public investment during
the crisis. 
On the first issue, the academic literature finds
mixed results, for good reasons: accurate data is
not available, it is difficult to isolate the influence
of other factors and methodologies are different
(see Appendix 2 for a survey)2. Nevertheless, a
number of studies have found that certain types of
public investment, such as infrastructure, are par-
ticularly beneficial.
On the second issue, there seems to be a consen-
sus that cuts in public investment during a reces-
sion have greater negative impacts on the
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economy than cuts in other expenditure cate-
gories, or tax increases. Europe during the recent
global and euro-area financial and economic
crises saw drastic cuts in all kinds of public invest-
ment in vulnerable member states and there was
also a relative decline in most of the other member
states: the share of public investment in primary
public expenditure declined. Thus, fiscal consoli-
dation strategies did not have growth-friendly
compositions and likely exaggerated the output
contractions. These developments are in stark
contrast to developments in other advanced
economies, in which public investment was used
as a counter-cyclical fiscal-stabilisation tool.
Recognising the benefits of public investment and
its particular exposure to fiscal consolidation in
Europe, in summer 2013 the European Commis-
sion proposed a so-called ‘investment clause’,
which allows member states that are in deep
recession, but that have budget deficits below the
three percent of GDP threshold and that respect
the public debt reduction rule, to temporarily devi-
ate from the fiscal targets of the Stability and
Growth Pact (SGP), to the extent of the national co-
funding of EU-funded investments. Four countries
have applied to use this investment clause, with
requests from Italy and Slovakia being rejected by
the European Commission. The European Parlia-
ment did not find the investment clause sufficient
and in October 2013 passed a resolution in which
it proposed to permanently and unconditionally
exclude national co-funding of EU-funded invest-
ments from the indicators used in the structural
deficit procedure. This proposal has so far not
been taken up.
What is the correct way to treat public investment
in the EU fiscal framework? This Policy Contribu-
tion addresses this question, after assessing
developments in public investment in Europe and
in other advanced economies.
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performed that of the EU Core since 1996. Switzer-
land and Canada have somewhat higher public
investment ratios than the EU-Core countries,
while Japan used to have much higher investment
rates, despite the major decline since 1995.
This long-term decline has not been offset by pri-
vate gross fixed capital formation. In Panel B of
Figure 1 it is evident that private-sector invest-
ment also declined between 1970 to 2013 in EU-
Core countries, and also in Japan, Switzerland and
to a lesser extent in Canada. In the four EU15 cohe-
sion countries, there was also a gradual decline
from 1970, but this lasted only until the mid-
1990s, when a major investment boom started,
which lasted until the global financial and eco-
nomic crisis. 
A number of hypotheses on the determinants of
the slowdown in public investment have been pro-
posed. One seminal contribution is Mehrotra and
Välilä (2006), who present a critical discussion of
the determinants of the slowdown and provide evi-
dence with a panel co-integration model for 1970-
2003 for EU member states. One of their main
findings is a negative effect on public investment
of discretionary fiscal consolidation and of high
public debt. The cost of debt financing and the
effort required to join EU economic and monetary
union do not seem to be significant, in contrast to
many arguments on the negative effect of the
introduction of Maastricht requirements on public
investment. Yet gross fixed capital formation also
declined in Switzerland and Canada until the mid-
DEVELOPMENTS IN PUBLIC INVESTMENT
Unfortunately, comprehensive data on public
investment is not available. The most widely used
indicator, gross fixed capital formation, is a very
imprecise measure of public investment, because
it is largely a gross measure (ie it includes capital
depreciation) and does not include investment by
state-owned enterprise (SOEs) (see Appendix 1
for details). However, we must use this indicator
because no other indicator is available for assess-
ing long-term trends.
Long-term trends
Panel A of Figure 1 indicates that public invest-
ment in the main advanced countries has been
characterised by a long-term downward trend
since the early 1970s, while in the four cohesion
countries of the EU15 (Greece, Ireland, Spain and
Portugal) and in the 12 member states that joined
the EU between 2004 and 2007 (EU12) there was
a gradual increase from 1995 up to 2008/2009.
Since then, most countries have moved from
expansive fiscal policies to very tight policies, with
fiscal programmes heavily focusing on public
investment.
As for the non-cohesion EU15 countries (a group
we call EU Core), general government gross fixed
capital formation has dropped from about 4.5 per-
cent of GDP in 1970 to less than 2.5 percent. A
minor decline is also evident for the United States,
for which gross fixed capital formation has out-
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Figure 1: Gross ﬁxed capital formation, % of GDP, 1970-2013
Source: Bruegel using the AMECO database. Note: EU-Core 9: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy,
Netherlands and the United Kingdom.  EU-Cohesion 4: Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. EU12: Bulgaria, Czech Republic,
Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Malta, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.
land, Spain and Portugal. At the same time, private
gross fixed capital formation also collapsed in
these countries, from more than 25 percent of GDP
in 2007 to less than 15 percent in 2013. There
was also a sizeable fall in public gross fixed capi-
tal formation in the 12 EU member states that
joined the bloc between 2004 and 2007 (the
EU12), and a minor decline in EU-Core countries.
These developments are in contrast to Canada,
Japan and the United States, where public gross
fixed capital formation has increased in recent
years.
Table 1 looks at the composition of the change in
public expenditure from 2009 to 2013, net of bank
recapitalisation by the public sector. For all EU
country groups, capital expenditure (defined here
as gross fixed capital formation and capital trans-
fers excluding bank recapitalisation) fell more
than other primary expenditure categories
between 2009 and 2013 in nominal terms3. There
was a particular collapse in the four EU15 cohe-
sion countries (51 percent) and in Italy (24 per-
cent). In the other EU-Core countries, capital
expenditure slightly declined (by 1 percent)
between 2009 and 2013 in nominal terms, while
all primary expenditures increased by 9 percent.
These developments in the EU were in contrast to
developments in the United States and Switzer-
land, where capital expenditure increased more
rapidly than other primary expenditure (such
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2000s, despite their healthy public sectors, which
might bring into question the importance of fiscal
consolidation episodes. Mehrotra and Välilä
(2006) also argue that it is unlikely that any polit-
ical drive toward a smaller economic role for the
state can account for the decline in public invest-
ment, because the share of tax revenue to GDP
has not become less significant in recent decades. 
Straub and Tchakarov (2007) add that in parallel
with the decline in public investment, public con-
sumption in the EU15 has increased. They also
note that public-private partnerships are a rela-
tively recent phenomenon that have become sig-
nificant only in a few EU countries, and cannot
therefore explain the long-term decline in public
investment.
Overall, we conclude that the long-term decline in
EU government gross fixed capital formation is
broadly in line with developments in other
advanced economies. However, the developments
during the global and euro-area financial and eco-
nomic crises were strikingly different.
Recent developments
Government investment has been a primary target
for fiscal consolidation. Panel A of Figure 1 indi-
cates that the share of public gross fixed capital
formation in GDP declined from 4 percent in 2009
to 1.5 percent in 2013, on average, in Greece, Ire-
Table 1: Fiscal adjustment strategies by main expenditure categories, % change from 2009 to 2013
(in current prices)
GR, IE, PT, ES Italy 10 other
EU15
EU12 United
States
Switzerland
Total expenditure -9 1 9 9 9 11
Interest expenditure 48 15 15 27 89 -6
Primary expenditure -12 -1 9 8 4 11
Compensation of employees -13 -4 7 3 3 10
Current transfers 1 7 12 11 12 11
Other current primary expenditure -19 -6 8 15 -13 13
Capital expenditure -51 -24 -1 -7 20 14
Source: Bruegel using the November 2013 AMECO. Notes: EU12 refers to the member states that joined the EU between 2004-2007.
EU15 refers to member states before 2004. GR, IE, PT, ES = Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain. The aggregates involving countries with differ-
ent currencies were calculated using constant exchange rates and therefore exchange rate fluctuations do not affect the values shown.
Capital expenditure is the sum of gross fixed capital formation and capital transfers (see Appendix 1 for the definitions). Capital transfers
also include public sector support to bank recapitalisation. Since we do not have detailed data on bank support, for countries in which the
2009 value of capital transfers was more than 10 percent larger than in 2006 and 2007, we used the average of 2006-07 capital trans-
fers for 2009, instead of the 2009 actual capital transfers. We made such a correction for: Belgium, Cyprus, Finland, Greece, Ireland,
Latvia, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, United Kingdom and United States. We also corrected the 2013 capital transfers
data for Slovenia (unusually high transfer), Slovakia (negative transfer), Netherlands (unusually low transfer) and Greece (unusually
high transfer): for Slovenia, Slovakia and the Netherlands we used 2012 data, while for Greece we used 2014 forecast (because 2012
data was also unusually high due to recapitalisation).
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4. ‘Economic affairs’ has
nine sub-components: 1
General economic,
commercial and labour
affairs; 2 Agriculture,
forestry, fishing and
hunting; 3 Fuel and energy;
4 Mining, manufacturing
and construction; 5
Transport; 6
Communication; 7 Other
industries; 8 R&D Economic
affairs; 9 Economic affairs
not elsewhere classified.
The dominant sub-
component of Economic
affairs is transport,
accounting for about 80-90
percent in most EU
countries, though in some
its share is only about 50
percent.
5. ‘Housing and community
amenities’ has six sub-
components: 1 Housing
development; 2 Community
development; 3 Water
supply; 4 Street lighting; 5
R&D Housing and
community amenities; 6
Housing and community
amenities not elsewhere
classified.
6. ‘Education’ has eight sub-
components: 1 Pre-primary
and primary education; 2
Secondary education; 3
Post-secondary non-tertiary
education; 4 Tertiary
education; 5 Education not
definable by level; 6
Subsidiary services to
education; 7 R&D
Education; 8 Education not
elsewhere classified.
7. In Italy, there were two
small categories (defence
and social protection) for
which an increase was
recorded from 2009 to
2011.
detailed data is not available in our data source for
other advanced countries). Table 1 shows the
developments in the nominal value of public
expenditure: taking into account inflation from
2009-13, in real terms there were even more sig-
nificant falls in capital expenditure in the EU.
What kinds of public investment were cut? Unfor-
tunately, data is available only for gross fixed cap-
ital formation (not available for capital transfers,
nor for measures of net investment) and only up
to 2011, and therefore we can show only a partial
picture for the first years of fiscal consolidation.
As Table 2 shows, in the four EU15 cohesion coun-
tries, total gross fixed capital formation fell by 36
percent during this period and every main cate-
gory suffered major cuts. The three largest cate-
gories of public investment are economic affairs4
(almost one-half of public gross fixed capital for-
mation), housing and community amenities5 (12
percent share) and education6 (10 percent share),
which were cut by 28 percent, 61 percent and 37
percent, respectively. In Italy, where public gross
fixed capital formation was cut by 16 percent from
2009 to 2011, most major categories suffered
from cuts of similar magnitude, including eco-
nomic affairs and education7. These changes refer
to the period up to 2011, but in 2012 and 2013
additional major cuts were implemented in public
investment and the November 2013 European
Commission forecast notes further expected cuts
in 2014: by an additional 15 percent in the four
EU15 cohesion countries and by 7 percent in Italy.
PUBLIC INVESTMENT IN THE EU FISCAL
FRAMEWORK
The previous section has shown that government
gross fixed capital formation has been a major
victim of fiscal consolidation in the EU. Therefore,
it is clear that the EU fiscal framework was unable
to foster public investment as a counter-cyclical
fiscal stabilisation tool during the deepest crisis
since the second world war in EU those countries
with fiscal space, in contrast to other advanced
economies. Furthermore, the EU fiscal framework
could not even prevent major collapses of public
investment in countries with vulnerable fiscal
positions, despite the supporting role of the EU
budget.
This dismal record is in spite of the claim by
European Commission (2012b, page 23) that “The
EU fiscal framework offers scope to balance the
acknowledgement of productive public
investment needs with fiscal discipline
objectives,” and several communications that
growth-friendly expenditure categories should be
preserved during fiscal consolidation. For
example, a decade ago, the European Commission
(2004, p. 30) noted that “For the countries with
high deficits, the budgetary consolidation
strategy, based on expenditure restraint, should
not be achieved at the expenses of the most
‘productive’ components of public spending (such
as public investment, education and research
expenditures).” The same suggestion was made
more recently in the Annual Growth Surveys
(AGS), which set growth-friendly fiscal
consolidation as a key objective. For example, the
2013 AGS issued the following recommendation:
“The Member States should strive in particular to
maintain an adequate fiscal consolidation pace
while preserving investments aimed at achieving
the Europe 2020 goals for growth and jobs. The
2013 AGS underlines that Investments in
education, research, innovation and energy
should be prioritised and strengthened where
possible, while ensuring the efficiency of such
expenditure.”
Table 2: Cuts in government gross ﬁxed capital
formation by function during the ﬁrst years of
ﬁscal adjustment, share (%) and % change from
2008/09 to 2011 (current prices)
GR, IE, PT, ES Italy
Share
(%)
Change
(%)
Share
(%)
Change
(%)
Total 100 -36 100 -16
General public services 6 -44 16 -16
Defence 2 -65 3 42
Public order and safety 3 -28 4 -26
Economic aﬀairs 46 -28 32 -15
Environment protection 6 -40 9 -14
Housing/community 12 -61 11 -33
Health 7 -44 9 -13
Recreation/culture 7 -30 7 -33
Education 10 -37 7 -14
Social protection 2 -27 2 11
Source: Bruegel using Eurostat’s general government expenditure
by function (COFOG) database. Notes: Share in 2008 and the
change from 2008 to 2011 in the aggregate of Greece, Ireland, Por-
tugal and Spain (GR, IE, PS and ES), and share in 2009 and the
change from 2009 to 2011 in Italy.
8. The Six-Pack consists of
five regulations and one
directive, which entered
into force in December
2011 for all EU countries.
See http://ec.europa.eu/econ-
omy_finance/articles/gover-
nance/2012-03-14_six_pack_
en.htm.
9. In November 2013, Euro-
pean Commission (2013)
reported that four countries
have applied for the invest-
ment clause, namely Bul-
garia, Italy, Slovakia and
Romania, of which Italy
(because it breached the
debt reduction rule) and
Slovakia (because it did not
correct the excessive deficit
in a lasting way) did not
qualify, while the assess-
ment for Bulgaria and
Romania is ongoing.
PROTECTING AND SUPPORTING PUBLIC INVESTMENT IN EUROPE Barbiero and Darvas
BR U EGE L
POLICY
CONTRIBUTION
06
But what are the provisions in the EU’s fiscal
framework that should shield productive invest-
ment when member states implement their budg-
etary policies? We list three aspects plus the
supporting role of the EU budget.
First, the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) was
strengthened by the recent reforms, making the
EU fiscal rules more stringent. In particular, the so-
called Six-Pack8 operationalised the public debt
rule: countries with a public debt in excess of 60
percent of GDP should reduce their public debt
ratio at an average yearly rate of one-twentieth of
the difference between their public debt ratio and
the 60 percent of GDP threshold. Meanwhile, the
Fiscal Compact (the inter-governmental Treaty on
Stability, Coordination and Governance (TSCG),
which entered into force on 1 January 2013 and is
binding for all euro-area member states that have
ratified it), requires a balanced budget with a lower
limit of a structural deficit of 0.5 percent of GDP (1
percent of GDP for Member States with a debt ratio
significantly below 60 percent of GDP). These
more stringent fiscal rules will limit even more the
fiscal room for manoeuvre, which is likely to
hinder public investment because it is the easiest
target of fiscal consolidation.
Second, there are a few specific provisions for
public investment, as summarised by European
Commission (2012b). Public investment is a rel-
evant factor when considering the launch of an
excessive deficit procedure (EDP) against a coun-
try. In the preventive arm of the SGP, government
gross fixed capital formation is averaged over a
number of years in order to avoid annual peaks in
investment, when defining the expenditure
benchmarks and structural balance objectives.
Supported by the request of the European Council
(2013) to explore “the possibilities offered by the
EU’s existing fiscal framework to balance the pro-
ductive public investment needs with fiscal disci-
pline objectives ... in the preventive arm of the
SGP”, Rehn (2013a) clarified the intention already
mentioned in European Commission (2012b) to
consider allowing temporary deviations from the
‘The European Parliament requested the Commission and member states to exploit the options
for public investment related to the implementation of EU-funded programmes to be excluded
from the definition of SGP structural deficits, but this call was not heeded.’
structural deficit path towards the MTO set in the
country-specific recommendations, or the MTO for
member states that have reached it, provided that
(1) economic growth is negative or well below its
potential, (2) the deviation does not lead to a
breach of the 3 percent of GDP deficit ceiling and
the public debt rule is respected, and (3) the devi-
ation is linked to national expenditure on projects
co-funded by the EU under its Structural and Cohe-
sion policy, Trans-European Networks (TEN) and
Connecting Europe Facility (CEF). Once weak eco-
nomic conditions are no longer a factor, any devi-
ation must be compensated for so that the time
path towards the MTO is not affected. This set of
criteria is called the ‘investment clause’ and was
first implemented when assessing 2014 national
budgets and the budgetary outcomes for 2013.
The European Parliament did not consider these
provisions sufficient and adopted a resolution on
8 October 2013 (European Parliament, 2013)
requesting the Commission and member states to
exploit the options for “public expenditure related
to the implementation of programmes co-financed
by the European Structural and Investment Funds
to be completely excluded from the definition of
SGP structural deficits”. As Prota and Viesti (2013)
noted in their summary of the debate on the
investment clause, this resolution was adopted by
the European Parliament by 433 votes to 131, a
large majority. But this call was not heeded by the
European Commission and a few days later, on 15
October 2013, Mr Rehn reiterated in his speech at
the ECOFIN that European Commission will con-
sider the three criteria listed in his letter of 3 July
2013 (see Rehn 2013a and 2013b)9.
Third, in the corrective arm of the SGP, the Council,
based on the recommendation of the European
Commission, granted extra time to end the exces-
sive deficit of a number of countries, which may
help to safeguard public investment.
While not directly related to the EU fiscal frame-
work, we also note that the substantial fall in
public investment happened despite the support-
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ing role of the EU budget, which aims to facilitate
better use of EU funds by: (i) reprogramming
funds towards the end of the end of the pro-
gramme period, and (ii) the reduction of national
co-financing through a temporary increase of co-
financing rates up to 95 percent for assistance for
member states with the greatest difficulties
(Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia and Portugal).
Figure 2 shows that EU-supported investment
(including the national co-financing) was a very
high share of public investment in most member
states that joined the EU in 2004-2007, while the
share is about one-half in Portugal and one-third
in Greece. In other EU15 member states, including
Spain and especially Ireland, the share is small.
How significant can these provisions be in pre-
serving public investment? Not very, in our view.
Most EU countries were under the excessive
deficit procedure during the fiscal adjustments of
recent years and therefore would have not been
able to benefit even from the modest investment
clause, had that been introduced earlier. In the
preventive arm, the treatment of public invest-
ment can have only limited effect. One reason for
this is that the 3 percent budget deficit threshold
and the debt reduction rule have to be respected
for getting a temporary deviation from the MTO, but
as Darvas (2013a) argued, it will be a major chal-
lenge for Italy and Spain to meet the debt reduc-
tion rule. Moreover, another condition for getting
temporary deviation from the MTO is that the
investment should be co-funded by the EU, but for
Spain, Italy and Ireland, the share of EU-funded
projects in total public investment was rather
small during 2009-11 (Figure 2) and this is
unlikely to change in the future. 
Therefore, we conclude that the EU’s fiscal frame-
work is not really conducive to preserving public
investment during economic slumps. 
AN ASYMMETRIC GOLDEN RULE FOR EUROPE?
The dismal record with public investment during
the crisis and the inability of the EU’s fiscal frame-
work to preserve such investment should raise
once again the issue of the incorporation of an
appropriate ‘golden rule’ in the EU fiscal frame-
work. A golden rule would mean a fiscal rule that
excludes capital expenditure from the computa-
tion of budget deficit requirements. The European
Parliament (2013) proposal, which was not acted
on by the Commission, would be a light form of the
golden rule, which would exclude investment co-
funded by the EU from the Stability and Growth
Pact (SGP) deficit requirement (see the previous
section). Beyond this proposal, the question of a
more comprehensive golden rule exempting ‘all’
or ‘most’ public investment should also be con-
sidered. Consideration of it should include
whether such a rule should be symmetric over the
business cycle or if it should be asymmetric in the
sense of having different provisions for economic
expansions and recessions.
A golden rule would have a strong rationale; see
for example Blanchard and Giavazzi (2004), who
advocated the exclusion of net public investment
from the deficit considered in the SGP and the
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Figure 2: Structural funds and national co-ﬁnancing as percent of the sum of total public gross ﬁxed
capital formation and investment grants, 2009-11 average
Sources: Chart in European Commission (2012a) reproduced using data from Eurostat.
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establishment of an investment agency in each
country to deal with the investment budget, which
should be separate from the current budget of the
government. Even European Commission (2004)
acknowledged that such a rule would have merits,
but its involvement in the SGP during its first
reform was rejected for the following reasons (Box
II. 6. in European Commission, 2004):
• It could entail maintaining high deficit for long
periods;
• It might create distortions, with physical infra-
structure preferred to other forms of capital or
current spending that might also be beneficial
over the long run;
• The difficulties in deciding which expenditure
categories should be granted special budget-
ary treatment;
• Net public investment is the relevant variable
for intergenerational equity, but it is just a
small fraction of gross investment;
• There would be significant incentives to record
current expenditure as capital spending.
There are arguments both for and against these
points10, but to inform the debate we can try to
assess what would have happened if, during the
crisis, a golden rule had been in place in such a
form that cuts in net public investment would have
been irrelevant for meeting the fiscal targets. Table
3 shows that in the four EU15 cohesion countries,
government net fixed capital formation was size-
able before the crisis and there were major
declines of about 3 percent of GDP by 2013, even
turning to negative in three of the four countries
and almost zero in Ireland. However, recent
research suggests that the fiscal multiplier is
higher during a recession than during expansions
and is particularly high for cutting public invest-
ment, see for example, the estimates of Auerbach
and Gorodnichenko (2012) which are reported in
Table 4. Baum et al (2012) reached similar con-
clusions. Therefore, preserving government
investment during the recent crisis might have led
to smaller output and the consequent employ-
ment falls and would have in fact reduced the
overall budget deficit if the multiplier is greater
than about two11. There is of course uncertainty
about econometric estimates of the multiplier, and
different countries may be characterised by dif-
ferent multipliers. But even if the multiplier is less
than two, but sizeable, preserving public invest-
ment would have reduced output and employ-
ment contraction at the expense of a not-so-large
increase in the overall budget deficit.
If net public investment was irrelevant for the
fiscal adjustment requirements under the SGP,
then governments would have been forced to cut
current spending, but they would have had the
option to keep public investment. Certainly, since
at the height of the crisis governments decided to
cut investment more deeply and not current
spending, governments may not have been happy
with a fiscal rule that forced them to cut current
spending instead of investments. In fact, the
United Kingdom, where a golden rule was intro-
Table 3: Net ﬁxed capital formation of the
general government (percent of GDP)
2000-09
average
2008/09 2013
Greece 1.5 1.7 -1.6
Ireland 2.5 3.7 0.2
Portugal 2.1 2.7 -0.7
Spain 1.5 0.9 -0.3
EU11 Core 0.5 0.6 0.3
EU12 1.2 2.2 1.2
Source: Bruegel based on AMECO. Note: the column 2008/09 indi-
cates the pre-crisis peak in net public investment: 2008 for Ireland,
Greece, Portugal and EU12, and 2009 for Spain and EU11 Core.
EU11 Core denotes 11 of the EU15, except Greece, Ireland, Spain
and Portugal. EU12 denotes the 12 member states that joined the
EU between 2004 and 2007.
Table 4: Fiscal multiplier estimates of Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012)
Total spending Consumption spending Investment spending
Measure 1 Measure 2 Measure 1 Measure 2 Measure 1 Measure 2
Linear 0.87 0.58 0.82 0.89 2.07 2.75
Expansion 0.49 -0.80 0.12 -0.16 2.82 1.94
Recession 2.12 2.17 2.28 1.37 2.79 4.26
Source: Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012). Note: Measure 1 is the maximum impact on output during 20 quarters. Measure 2 is the
ratio of the sum of the output response (to a shock in government spending) to the sum of government spending response (to a shock in
government spending) during 20 quarters, which has the rationale since the size of the multiplier depends on the persistence of fiscal
shocks. The estimates are statistically different from zero except the multipliers of consumption spending during an expansion.
10. Blanchard and Giavazzi
(2004) challenge some of
these arguments.
11. When the multiplier is
greater than two and public
revenues amount to 50 per-
cent of GDP, a cut in expen-
diture is in fact increases
the budget deficit even in
nominal terms: a €1 euro
cut in public expenditures
reduces output by more
than €2 and therefore the
revenues by more than €1.
09
BR U EGE L
POLICY
CONTRIBUTIONBarbiero and Darvas  PROTECTING AND SUPPORTING PUBLIC INVESTMENT IN EUROPE
duced in 1997, suspended it in 2008 (see Box 1),
and Germany, where a golden rule was also in
place earlier, replaced it with the so called ‘debt-
brake’ in 2011.
Nevertheless, during the current crisis, a fiscal rule
giving special status to net public investment
would have improved outcomes: more growth-
friendly composition of fiscal consolidation (as
governments would have been forced to cut cur-
rent expenditures, but not investments), lower
output and employment falls in the short term (as
the fiscal multiplier is smaller for current spend-
ing than for investments), and better growth
prospects in the medium- and long-term (because
of the higher stock of public capital and reduced
destruction of human capital resulting from
longer-term unemployment). Even Turrini (2004),
who on balance concluded that a golden rule is not
desirable for the EU fiscal framework, noted that a
golden rule “may help to avoid an excessive com-
pression of desirable investment projects espe-
cially during periods in which fiscal
consolidations are needed to respect the require-
ment of fiscal discipline of the EU fiscal frame-
work”. So an appropriate golden rule can be
particularly helpful during a crisis.
Beyond these crisis-related fiscal consolidation
issues, the standard arguments in favour of a
golden rule are also appealing:
• Intra-generational equity requires that the cost
of public investment should be borne by future
generations who will benefit from it and there-
fore capital expenditure should be financed
through debt and not by taxes paid by the cur-
rent generation (Blanchard and Giavazzi,
2004).
• In the presence of deficit limits, socially desir-
able public investment projects may not be
undertaken (Turrini, 2004), and a golden rule
could help to avoid strategic underinvestment
(Peletier, Dur and Swank, 1999).
• In corporate accounting, the cost of invest-
ment is not charged to a single year when the
investment is implemented, but distributed
across the years of its use: this principle has
merits and should be adopted in public sector
fiscal rules by an appropriate golden rule.
Certainly, there are major conceptual and techni-
cal difficulties in selecting which expenditure cat-
egories should be granted special budgetary
treatment, as also emphasised by Turrini (2004).
But these difficulties should not prevent the con-
sideration of a rule that would be effective in crisis
times. Instead, proper provisions should be made
to prevent the emergence of adverse incentives
during good times, methodologies for calculating
BOX 1: THE UK’S GOLDEN RULE AND ITS SUSPENSION
Creel et al (2009) summarised the two key features of the UK code for fiscal stability, which was in
place before 2008: (1) the ‘golden rule’, according to which government borrowing should not exceed
net capital formation over the cycle, which allowed the government to “spread the cost of durables
over the financial years during which they will be used and to spread the burden of capital forma-
tion over the generation of taxpayers that will be benefiting from it” and (2) the ‘sustainable invest-
ment rule’ to prevent over-investment and to limit net public debt. Creel et al (2009) found, using
structural vector autoregressions (SVARs), that the introduction of the UK golden rule in 1997
strengthened the positive effect of public investment on output.
Notwithstanding this positive finding on the golden rule’s contribution to economic growth, the rule
did not prevent the expansion of public debt during the crisis. One reason for this was of course the
extraordinary shock to the UK’s financial system and the associated contraction of the economy. But
there were also some specific weaknesses of the UK’s fiscal framework. Dupont and Kwarteng
(2012) concluded that the main reason for the failure of the UK golden rule is that it failed to bring
the budget back into surplus, as it required a balanced current budget over the economic cycle and
therefore the government could always prolong a deficit as long as it could project surpluses in the
near future. In this regard, Dupont and Kwarteng (2012) also concluded that the fiscal rule gave
politicians too much flexibility, left no room for error, and spending plans were based on over-opti-
mistic forecasts.
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net investment and accounting practices should
be harmonised across the EU, and the current and
capital budgets should be separated, along with
greatly increased transparency of the capital
budget.
We note that the EU fiscal framework builds
strongly on the notions of potential output and
structural budget balance: two unobservable vari-
ables, whose theoretical definitions are ambigu-
ous. Yet an agreement was found on how to define
and how to estimate these concepts. These esti-
mates play major roles in the fiscal framework,
despite well-known deficiencies, such as major
revisions for the past (Darvas, 2013b). Analo-
gously, the difficulties in defining the net invest-
ment measure to be excluded from the deficit
considered in the SGP as least during bad times,
should not prohibit the revision of the EU fiscal
framework if that would improve economic out-
comes.
A straightforward way to add an asymmetric
golden rule to the current EU fiscal framework
would be as follows: whenever the negative output
gap exceeds a threshold – for example, actual
output falls by more than one percent below
potential output – the permitted structural deficit
is increased by the amount of net public invest-
ment. This would apply for each stage specified in
the current EU framework. For example if a coun-
try's permitted budget balance in 2014 is €10 bil-
lion, and net public investment is €2 billion, the
permitted budget balance would increase to €12
billion. If in 2015 the permitted budget balance is
€7 billion and net public investment is €1 billion,
the permitted budget balance would increase to
€8 billion. A cut in net public investment would
then by definition reduce the extra room for deficit.
When the negative output gap is eliminated and
actual output reaches potential output, a transi-
tion period lasting for, for example, three years,
would start, during which the extra room for the
deficit would be gradually eliminated. Therefore,
such a system would incentivise governments to
retain investment levels and cut instead current
expenditures during an economic downturn, while
allowing them a larger overall budget deficit than
in the current EU fiscal framework. But the elimi-
nation of this extra room for the deficit in good
times would address the concern that investment
is unduly favoured over other types of govern-
ment expenditure at times when governments
have more fiscal space. The public debt rule could
also be amended to make it consistent with the
deficit rule. Such a system would not be prone to
the drawbacks of the UK golden rule (Box 1).
PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC INVESTMENT IN THE EU
The long-term decline in public investment since
the 1970s in EU-Core countries is broadly in line
with other advanced economies, but develop-
ments during the global and euro-area financial
and economic crises have been different: public
investment increased in Canada, Japan and the
United States, but there was a modest fall in EU-
Core countries, and a dramatic collapse in vulner-
able EU member states, despite support from EU
funds. All types of public investment were cut,
including transport-related investments (which
accounts for only about one-third of public invest-
ments in vulnerable euro-area members), educa-
tion, health, social protection, environment
protection, and so on. Since the fiscal multiplier
during a deep recession is likely to be higher than
normal times, and the multiplier for productive
government investment is especially high, pre-
serving public investment could have made a
sizeable difference in terms of output, employ-
ment and medium-term growth potential, while
not having a major negative impact on budget
deficits and debt ratios.
The EU fiscal framework has very modest provi-
sions on preserving public investment, which is
typically the first target of fiscal consolidation. The
recently-inserted investment clause, which might
allow a temporary deviation from fiscal targets for
EU funding-related investments if the economy is
in a deep recession and the three percent of GDP
deficit rule and the debt reduction rule are
‘During the crisis preserving public investment could have made a sizeable difference in terms
of the output, employment rate and medium-term growth potential of European Union countries,
while not having a major negative impact on budget deficits and debt ratios.’
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12. See Darvas (2012) and
Wolff (2012).
respected, is of almost no help. Therefore, some-
thing more decisive has to be done.
Unfortunately, the European Parliament's October
2013 call to exclude, permanently and uncondi-
tionally, all national co-funding of EU-supported
investments from the fiscal indicators considered
in the Stability and Growth Pact, has not been
acted on so far. In the short term, given the diffi-
culties in making a more significant modification
to the EU fiscal framework, this proposal would be
a sensible way to support investment, even
though it would have rather limited impact: in
Spain, Cyprus, Italy and Ireland (four older EU
member states with high public debt ratios) the
share of EU-supported investment is rather low,
while in Greece, Portugal and the newer member
states national co-financing is typically small. Yet
even some help is better than none.
But in the medium term, more ambitious support
for public investment should be considered. A kind
of asymmetric golden rule, which would exclude
a measure of net public investment from the fiscal
indicators of the SGP at least during recessions,
would be a sensible option. Such a rule would
have strong rationale, because it would lead to
more a growth-friendly composition of fiscal con-
solation, thereby limiting the fall in output and
employment in the short term, and offering better
growth prospects for the medium/long-term. The
rule may also be asymmetric during the business
cycle and work differently in good and bad times.
In good times, it should be formulated in a way to
prevent perverse incentives, such as an excessive
preference of physical infrastructure over other
growth-related expenditure. In bad times, the
major goal should be the preservation of net public
investment. The difficulties in defining, measuring
and monitoring the net investment items to be
excluded should not prevent a proper incorpora-
tion of the rule. As a comparison, indicators of
potential output and structural budget balance are
also included in the EU fiscal framework, even
though they are very difficult to define conceptu-
ally and to estimate empirically, and earlier esti-
mates were revised significantly. The
incorporation of a golden rule should of course be
accompanied by the harmonisation of EU account-
ing and reporting practices, the investment budget
of the government should be separated from the
current budget and the transparency of public
investments should be increased.
Beyond an appropriate golden rule, which may
help to prevent a collapse in public investment in
vulnerable countries, the EU fiscal framework
should more actively use public investment as a
cyclical stabilisation tool during recessions, simi-
lar to what happened in a number of non-EU
advanced and emerging countries recently. The
first best option would be an EU, or at least a euro-
area, fiscal stabilisation instrument12. But if the
development of such a common instrument is not
Table 5: Government net ﬁxed capital formation
and the stock of public capital (% of GDP)
Government NFCF,
2013
Government capi-
tal stock, 2010
Estonia 2.6 N/A
Romania 2.5 N/A
Bulgaria 2.4 N/A
Poland 1.9 N/A
Latvia 1.7 N/A
Luxembourg 1.6 N/A
Sweden 1.2 49
Lithuania 1.2 N/A
Cyprus 1.1 N/A
United Kingdom 1.0 36
Malta 1.0 N/A
Slovenia 0.8 N/A
Hungary 0.8 N/A
United States 0.7 52
France 0.5 54
Croatia 0.4 N/A
Finland 0.4 43
Denmark 0.3 44
Netherlands 0.3 58
Ireland 0.2 51
Italy -0.1 57
Belgium -0.1 35
Germany -0.2 42
Austria -0.2 40
Portugal -0.3 50
Spain -0.7 52
Czech Republic -1.0 N/A
Slovakia -1.0 N/A
Greece -1.6 49
Source: Bruegel using data from AMECO November 2013 vintage
(NFCF) and Checherita-Westphal, Hughes-Hallett and Rother, 2012
(public capital stock). Note: NFCF data of the United States is from
2011. The capital stock estimation is based on a number of assump-
tions and uses GFCF data, which does not include all public invest-
ment, nor privatisation (see Appendix 1), and therefore the results
should be treated with caution. The countries are ordered accord-
ing the NFCF.
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APPENDIX 1: WHAT IS PUBLIC INVESTMENT? SOME DEFINITIONS AND CLARIFICATIONS
Conceptually, investment directly financed from the budgets of public sector entities should be con-
sidered as public investment, but it is extremely difficult to measure it and all available indicators are
imprecise. Here we consider the following indicators:
• Gross fixed capital formation of the general government;
• General government gross capital expenditure;
• Net fixed capital formation of the general government;
• Public-private partnerships (PPPs);
• Investment by state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and privatisation of SOEs.
The most widely-used indicator of public investment is gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) of the gen-
eral government14. This deals with produced tangible and intangible non-financial assets (eg dwellings,
machinery, cultivated assets, software, major improvements to existing assets, land reclamation, etc).
Financial assets, such as the ownership of companies, are excluded. It is important to notice that state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) that are treated as 'market operators', such as railway companies or power-
grid companies, are classified in the corporate sector and not as part of the general government, and
therefore government GFCF potentially excludes a large part of infrastructure investment.
An alternative measure of gross public investment is the sum of gross fixed capital formation and gov-
ernment capital transfers15, 16. But a drawback of this measure is that capital transfers also include gov-
ernment subsidies to private investments that are not a component of public investments. In Figure 3
we compare gross fixed capital formation plus capital transfers (ie capital expenditure), and distin-
guish within the capital transfers the share of ‘investment grants’ that in principle should net out the
effect of other capital transfers that do not entail creation of fixed capital.
Figure 3: Gross ﬁxed capital formation, investment grants and other elements of capital transfers
(percent of GDP), 2011
Source: Eurostat database, Government national accounts. Note that data on capital transfers and investment grants is not
available for the EU member states not included in the figure.
Certainly, net capital formation would be a better indicator of investment than gross capital formation,
since usage and time depreciates the capital stock. A positive gross investment may actually imply
disinvestment (ie decline of the capital stock), if gross investment does not reach the value of depre-
ciation. GFCF of the general government is a gross measure in the sense that it does not consider depre-
ciation, yet it also has a net component in the sense that the value of the acquisition of new investments
is netted against sales or other disposals of existing capital goods17. When deducting capital depreci-
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14. A related concept is
‘Gross Capital Formation’
(code P5 in the nomencla-
ture used by the European
System of Accounts – ESA-
95), which is the sum of
three components: Gross
fixed capital formation
(P51), Changes in invento-
ries (P52), Acquisitions less
disposals of valuables
(P53).
15. Capital transfers (D9)
cover: i) Capital taxes (D91)
– taxes on capital transfers:
inheritance taxes, death
duties and taxes on gifts. Ii)
Investment grants (D92) –
consist of capital transfers
in cash or in kind made by
government or by the rest
of the world to other resi-
dent or non-resident institu-
tional units to finance all or
part of the costs of their
acquiring fixed assets, iii)
Other capital transfers
(D99).
16. Capital expenditure is
defined as P51 (Gross Fixed
Capital Formation) and D9
(Capital Transfers Consoli-
dated) in ESA-95.
17. These sales and
disposals of non-financial
assets include
privatisations of
government-owned non-
financial properties, such
as eg the sale of an office
building: these are
deducted from the value of
new acquisitions of non-
financial assets and are
therefore accounted in a
negative way in gross fixed
capital formation.
Privatisations of SOEs are
not included in the concept
and therefore do not affect
gross fixed capital
formation of the general
government.
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ation, the differences between gross and net investment can be quite significant, as Figure 4 shows.
In a number of countries (Italy, Belgium, Germany, Austria, Portugal, Spain, Czech Republic, Slovakia and
Greece) gross investment in 2012 was below capital depreciation and therefore the net public capital
stock has declined. Unfortunately, it is even more difficult to measure capital depreciation than gross
investment and therefore net capital formation is a less reliable indicator.
Figure 4: Gross and net public investment (capital formation), % of GDP, 2013
Source: AMECO database. Note: 2012data for the US, 2010 data for Canada. Net fixed capital formation is available at current
prices and then expressed as a share of GDP. 
Public-private partnerships (PPPs) further complicate the measurement of public investment. PPPs
are an innovative financing mechanism of infrastructure investments. Until 2004, the treatment of
PPPs in national accounts was not uniform across Europe, in the absence of EU-wide guidelines. The
novelty of the instrument and the different treatment by EU member states is also reflected in the
absence of systematic data on PPPs. The European PPP Expertise Centre (EPEC)18 regularly monitors
European PPPs; according to EPEC, the aggregate value of PPP transactions that reached financial close
on the European market in the first half of 2013 amounted to €9 billion, which is a rather small amount
compared to government GFCF in the EU. Unfortunately, the actual contribution of government into
project financed through PPPs is rather difficult to estimate. Despite the lack of comparable data, we
know that the share of PPPs is relatively small compared to government investment (Peree and Välilä,
2007). In their study, Peree and Välilä (2007) combine different sources on micro-level data on proj-
ects structured as PPPs to obtain estimates on PPPs at the aggregate level. According to the authors,
until 2006 the only countries in which PPPs seemed to have a systemic importance were the UK and
Portugal, in which the average total project amount of PPPs (ie stocks) was around 20-33 percent of
average public investment flow, while in all other countries even the stock value of signed public-pri-
vate partnership contracts is small compared to annual public investment flows.
Finally, the treatment of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) further distorts the picture of public invest-
ment. While first principles suggests that SOEs are part of the public sector, investment by SOEs are not
included in government GFCF (as we noted previously), which is one reason why GFCF is a distorted
measure of gross investment. When the public capital stock is calculated from government time series
of GFCF, which is typically the case, then it misses the capital stock of SOEs which is therefore one more
reason why the estimated public capital stock is also a distorted measure. Also, privatisation of SOEs
should, by definition, reduce the public capital stock, but this effect cannot be incorporated by esti-
mates for the capital stock for two reasons: the capital stock of SOEs is not incorporated in public cap-
ital stock estimates and there is no comprehensive data on privatisation either.
The unmistakable conclusion is that all available indicators on public investment and public capital are
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imprecise and major improvements would be needed in statistical services to be able to offer a correct
and comprehensive picture of gross and net public investment and capital. 
APPENDIX 2: PUBLIC INVESTMENT AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
The empirical literature on the effects of public investment and capital on economic growth is somewhat
inconclusive, though the majority of studies find positive effects. This might be because of several fac-
tors.
One reason for this inconclusiveness is the difficulty of defining and measuring public investment, as
discussed in Appendix 1. This makes any selection of the variable to be used in the empirical analysis
imperfect.
• Coverage: as noted in Appendix 1, public GFCF, the indicator most widely used, does not include
investment of SOEs and therefore this indicator potentially misses an important share of public
investment.
• Gross vs net: net public investment is the proper indicator of additions to the public capital stock,
but data on net investment are even less reliable. 
• Composition of public investment/capital: A considerable portion of public investment is functional
to the supporting of broad functions of government, such as the provision of public services, main-
taining law and order, community amenities and administration, which can improve the business
climate and the quality of public services, but they may have different impacts on economic per-
formance than, for example, highways and schools. Lucas (1998) argued that public investment in
education increases the level of human capital and this can be seen as a main source of long-run
economic growth. However, not just investment, but current spending on education and health is
also growth-enhancing and therefore the most widely-used indicator of public investment (GFCF)
is narrow in the sense that it does not cover all public spending that adds to a country’s productive
potential. 
• Flow vs stock: the data on public capital stock would be better for analytical purposes than invest-
ments, but it is even more problematic to measure than public investment. Only a few studies
attempted to estimate the stock of public capital, but these estimates rely on a number of assump-
tions which introduce major uncertainties. Furthermore, the capital stock estimates are based on
historical GFCF, which, as we argued above, does not include all public investment, including the
investment of SOEs. Also, capital stock estimates do not used to consider privatisation, which was
a significant factor in reducing the public capital stock in a number of countries. 
A second reason for the inconclusiveness of the empirical literature is the difficulty of isolating the
effect of public investment on long-term growth, because there are several other variables. Moreover,
the nature of infrastructure investment implies that the full impact on growth of investment in roads,
telecommunications and other infrastructure can only be realised with considerable lags, once effec-
tive networks have been established (Straub and Tchakarov, 2007). It is difficult to formulate a model
that approximates well the delayed impacts.
Thirdly, the results might also depend on the methodology used. Traditionally, the effect of public invest-
ment on growth has been analysed using four major methodologies (Straub and Tchakarov, 2007; Tur-
rini, 2004).
The estimation of aggregate production functions that relate output to public capital stocks. A seminal
article using this approach was Aschauer (1989), who found that, for the United States, public invest-
ment would exert a strong positive impact on production. This article triggered a debate among aca-
demics, with subsequent analyses testing different levels of aggregations, but mostly leading to weak
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results. In a recent paper applying panel econometric methods, Calderón, Moral-Benito and Servén
(2014) find both statistically and economically highly significant impact of infrastructure on output,
which is robust to alternative dynamic specifications and infrastructure measures.
1 The second strand of methodologies focuses on cost or profit functions of private sector firms, to
assess whether public capital lowers business costs. The results arising from these analyses are
quite ambiguous, though in most of the cases public capital is found to reduce the costs of private
sector firms (Turrini, 2004).
2 A third strand of studies analyses, using mostly cross-section regressions, aims to study the impact
of public capital on the growth potential of countries or regions rather than the level of output19.
These papers assess whether public investment helps explain differences in cross-country or cross-
regional growth, with the underlying concept that that public capital has an impact on the accumu-
lation possibilities of the economy, rather than on the level of output. Positive results are obtained
when using a subcomponent of public capital, namely infrastructure in transport and telecommu-
nications20. 
3 A fourth strand of literature uses vector autoregressions (VAR) to analyse the direction of causation.
Yet even within this group of studies results are rather inconclusive, as for instance the evidence
does not support the claim that public investment rather than consumption boosts growth21 or that
public investment pays for itself in the long run. Most of these studies focus on public investment
rather than on public capital, as it was the case for aggregate production function studies. Pereira
(2000, 2001) and Pereira and Andraz (2005) found that all types of public investment affect pos-
itively private output, yet core infrastructure investments display the highest rate of return, and
that this positive effect is mainly due to a crowding-in effect on private investment. Voss (2002), in
contrast to Pereira, showed that public investment tends to crowd out private investments. Sturm
et al (1999) found a positive and significant short-run effect of public investment, but no long-run
effects, while Creel, Monperrus-Veroni and Saraceno (2009) and Tenhofen, Wolff and Heppke-Falk
(2010) found long-term effects22.
Let us also highlight that Aschauer (1998) and Barro (1990) argued that the relationship between
public investment and growth could even turn negative once public capital is above certain threshold.
In fact maintaining or expanding the existing capital stock may require high tax rates, which would
reduce growth, all other things being equal.
Therefore, there are good reasons for mixed results in the academic literature, though a number of stud-
ies found that certain types of public investment/capital, like infrastructure, are conducive to economic
growth. 
19. Barro (1991), Easterly
and Rebelo (1993), Holtz-
Eakin and Schwartz (1995).
20. Calderon and Serven
(2003), Easterly and
Rebelo (1993) for instance.
Note that these works refer
to Latin America.
21. See, among the others,
Perotti (2004).
22. For a comprehensive lit-
erature survey, see
Arslanalp et al (2010).
